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THE MODERN GENDER GAP IN PARTISANSHIP AND IDEOLOGY: A CROSS
NATIONAL ANALYSIS

by

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B.A. University of Central Florida, 2011

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of Political Science
in the College of Sciences
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ABSTRACT

This thesis updates and expands upon the developmental theory of the gender gap in party and ideological identification originally posited by Norris and Inglehart (2000) to explain why women in advanced industrial nations are more likely to hold more leftist ideological identification than men. A comparative cross-national analysis using data from the World Values Survey (2004-2008) extends Norris and Inglehart's study, with an examination of the gender gap in advanced industrial, post-communist and developing nations. To further explore the nature of the gender gap in the United States, data from the American National Election Study (Cumulative File and 2012 cross-section) are used to explain the evolution of the ideological and partisan gender gap over time. Moreover, such a focus can also help explain any subnational difference in the gender gap in the two regions that have experienced a partisan realignment: the South toward the Republican party and the Northeast toward the Democratic party.

Findings from the comparative analysis support the notion in advanced-industrial nations the gender gap has persisted, and indeed grown, with women identifying more with the left than men. This gender gap is robust as it remains significant even when utilizing a multivariate analysis to control for variables that measure social structure and cultural attitudes. However, in post-communist and developing nations a gender gap is less evident although some evidence shows that women in post-communist societies are experiencing a secular realignment and are slowly moving toward leftist ideological orientations. Findings from the analysis of the U.S. demonstrate little regional differences, with women in the South being more liberal and increasingly more Democratic, while women in the Northeast are also more liberal and increasingly Democratic in their party identifications.

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my friends and family. Your love and support provided me with the courage to pursue my dreams, for which I am eternally grateful.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES	vii
LIST OF TABLES	viii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
The Cross-National Study	3
The U.S. Specific Study	4
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW	9
The Traditional Gender Gap	9
Theories of Gender Dealignment	10
Theories of Gender Realignment	11
The Developmental Theory of Gender Realignment	16
CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODS	20
Cross-National Analysis Variables	20
Dependent Variable	21
Independent Variables	21
U.S. Specific Analysis Variables	23
Dependent Variables	24
Independent Variables	24
CHAPTER FOUR: THE CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS	28

CHAPTER FIVE: THE U.S. SPECIFIC ANALYSIS.....	38
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH.....	50
Cross-National Conclusions and Implications.....	50
U.S. Specific Conclusion and Implications	51
Future Research.....	53
REFERENCES	57

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Gender Gap in Voting for President (Final Pre-Election Polls)	6
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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: The Effects of Gender on Left-Right Ideology Scale in Advanced Industrial Societies, 2004-2008.....	28
Table 2: The Effects of Gender on Left-Right Ideology Scale in Post-Communist Societies, 2004-2008.....	31
Table 3: The Effects of Gender on Left-Right Ideology Scale in Developing Societies, 2004-2008.....	33
Table 4: The Effect of Gender on Ideology in Advanced Industrialized, Post-Communist, and Developing Societies by Country, 2004-2008.....	36
Table 5: The Effects of Gender on Party Identification in the U.S. by Decade	38
Table 6: The Effects of Gender on Ideology in the U.S. by Decade	40
Table 7: The Effects of Gender on Party Identification in the Northeastern U.S.....	42
Table 8: The Effects of Gender on Ideology in the Northeastern U.S. by Decade.....	44
Table 9: The Effects of Gender on Party Identification in the Southern U.S. by Decade.....	46
Table 10: The Effects of Gender on Ideology in Southern U.S. by Decade	48

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Much scholarly consensus exists to support the notion that since around the 1980s, post-industrial democracies such as those in Western Europe and the United States have been experiencing an electoral realignment, with a new emerging gender based electoral cleavage characterized by women identifying increasingly with political parties and ideologies of the Left while men identify increasingly with Rightist ideology and parties (Box-Steffenmeier, DeBoef, Lin, 2004; Christy, 1987; Dalton, 2008; Kauffman and Petrocik, 1999; Norris, 1988, 1999, 2002; Norris and Evans, 1999; Norris and Inglehart, 2000, 2012). Relevant and salient cleavages, in this case gender, which greatly impact the political attitudes of citizens are important to study and analyze in order to better understand how and why voters make the decisions they do on election day, as well as to have a greater understanding of the composition of political parties. Also, if a gender based cleavage is found to be enduring and stable, there will be a substantial impact on elections, voting behavior, and mass coalitional politics in general making this topic particularly important to these areas of political research (Dalton, 2008; Norris and Evans, 1999).

An electoral realignment is essentially defined as the replacement of one societal cleavage with another cleavage on the basis of interests or issues (Burnham 1970; Key 1955; 1959; Sundquist 1983). The focus here is on a gender based cleavage in ideology and partisanship, and is tied to and works in close proximity with the “New Politics” cleavage, which refers to an ideological division based on post-materialist issues like abortion, gay marriage, gender equality, and environmental concerns which are relevant and prevalent to economically, socially, and democratically developed societies (Dalton 2008). This “New Politics” cleavage,

rather than the “Old Politics” cleavage characterized by issues like social welfare, class politics, and economic policy, plays a role in producing and emphasizing this gender based partisan and ideological realignment with women moving to the Left and men supporting the Right as many new politics issues pertain specifically to women (Dalton 2008). This gender electoral realignment resulting from “New Politics” issues is important to the literature on elections, as electoral realignment is typically present in critical elections and shows a distinct change or alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate (Key 1955; 1959; Mayhew 2002). Furthermore, a greater understanding of this phenomenon is vital because the change in voting patterns driving realignment determines the nature of politics and political action for many years to follow. Typically, once a stable voting pattern is established, so too is the realignment, altering voting behavior, institutional roles, and policy outputs (Burnham 1970).

Though gender based cleavages cut across the predominant and “traditional” social group bases of party support, like socioeconomic status or income for example, and are often considered to be secondary in relevance to such social welfare issues, Norris and Inglehart (2000) have provided ample evidence to support the notion that not only are men and women divided along partisan and ideological lines, but also that the level of economic and societal development (modernization) specific to a region plays a large role in this division. Essentially, the developmental theory of the gender gap posits that more industrialized and democratically and socially developed nations like that of Western Europe and the United States are influenced by new and post-materialistic cleavages (New Politics), while developing and post-communist societies like Mexico and Russia are found to adopt more traditional, materialistic cleavages (Old Politics) with women adhering mostly to Rightist parties and ideologies. The disparity in issue

saliency and relevance between developed societies and their less developed counterparts produce two different types of gender gaps: a modern one for the developed societies and a more traditional one for the developing and post-communist ones.

This study seeks to support the idea that the level of societal modernization in a nation is linked to cultural and structural trends in that country that influence partisanship and ideology, also known as the developmental theory of the gender gap. Higher levels of modernization and democratic development are associated with the rise of post-materialist values and lower levels of modernization and democratic development in a country are associated with materialist, more traditional values (Dalton 2008; Norris and Inglehart 2000). Because value systems influence the decision making process in regard to issue opinions, voting, and ideology, the differing value systems based on societal development produce predictable voting patterns based on society type. Therefore, based on the developmental theory of the gender gap as proposed by Norris and Inglehart (2000), a cross-national analysis and comparison will be employed based on societal development and modernization as well as a U.S. specific analysis. This study seeks to update and extend Norris and Inglehart's 1980-2000 study to 2008 in order to better understand the nature of the gender gap and electoral realignment.

The Cross-National Study

Because Norris and Inglehart find evidence of discernible voting patterns on the basis of gender and democratic society type, the main hypotheses in this study are: (1) women in advanced industrial societies are more likely to identify with Leftist ideology than their male counterparts, (2) women in post-communist societies are more likely to have "traditional"

ideologies and will identify more with the Right ideologically than their male counterparts, and (3) women in developing societies are more likely to identify with ideologies of the Right than their male counterparts. For continuity and comparability to the study by Norris and Inglehart, the World Values Survey (2004-2008) will be used in this portion of the analysis and multivariate regressions will be run to test the hypotheses.

The U.S. Specific Study

Additionally, due to a vast amount of literature focusing on the gender gap in the U.S. exclusively, with some authors even arguing that such a gap is most prominent or only exists in the U.S, I apply the developmental theory to the U.S. and hypothesize that (4) women in the U.S. are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and liberal ideology than their male counterparts, (5) women in the south are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and liberal ideology than their male counterparts, and (6) women in the northeast are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and liberal ideology than their male counterparts.

Although the United States is an advanced industrialized nation showing signs of experiencing a modern gender gap, the unique partisan and ideological polarization that is present within the U.S., specifically between the northeast and the southern regions, may affect the strength or the presence of the gap. Perhaps the developmental theory could be applied to these two regions, showing a connection between the level of economic development in either the northeast or south to the political parties that maintain a stronghold in those states. For example, many southern states which lag in post-industrial development like South Carolina, Kentucky, and Mississippi are considered to be some of the strongest Republican states.

Conversely, states with a strong Democratic presence like those in the northwest and northeast for instance are very post-industrial in nature, with the spread of ideas and various service industries replacing traditional manufacturing companies and industries (Black and Black 1987; 2008; Judis and Texeira 2002).

Furthermore, college educated women are increasingly characterized as a “democratic group” while college educated men are increasingly identifying with the Republican Party. Analyzing this concept given that the northeast is experiencing an emerging democratic majority while the south remains predominantly Republican should provide some insight on the nature of the gender gap in the United States (Judis and Texeira 2002; Schaller 2006). The differences in partisanship and ideology in these regions based on gender will make for an interesting find and will certainly add to the literature on voting behavior and ideological orientation in the United States.

Multivariate regressions will be run by decade from the 1970s to 2008 using pooled American National Election Study (ANES) data in order to compare partisanship and ideology of the less economically developed south to that of the industrially thriving northern states. Also, regressions will be run using the 2012 Cross Section Data from the ANES to include the most recent and current ideological and partisanship information. Because the United States is often over-studied in the realm of political science, a number of theorists and authors have covered the presence of the gender gap in the region but with mixed, contrary results and outcomes.

Figure 1 (below) provides some clarity to this issue by showing the gender gap in voting in presidential elections in the U.S. from 1952 to 2012 and illustrates the emerging gender based cleavage.

Year	Men	Women	Gap (difference)
2012	-8	+12	20 pts.
2008	0	+14	14 pts.
2004	-12	+4	16 pts.
2000	-7	+8	15 pts.
1996	+1	+15	14 pts.
1992	+4	+8	4 pts.
1988	-12	-4	8 pts.
1984	-28	-10	18 pts.
1980	-15	-5	10 pts.
1976	+8	-3	11 pts.
1972	-26	-24	2 pts.
1968	-2	+2	4 pts.
1964	+20	+24	4 pts.
1960	+4	-2	6 pts.
1956	-10	-22	12 pts.
1952	-6	-16	10 pts.

Figure 1 Gender Gap in Voting for President (Final Pre-Election Polls)

Source: 2012 Gallup Poll

The figure shows the lead-deficit for the Democratic candidate among men and women in these elections, in percentage points. The values represent the pre-election estimate of the majority candidate vote for each election weighted based on the actual election results.

According to the 2012 Gallup poll results in figure 1, a positive lead is shown for the Democratic candidate by both men and women in 1992, but the lead becomes overwhelming amongst women in 1996 with a 14 point lead in democratic candidate support. 2012 shows the largest voting gap at 20 points, with a 12 percentage point lead among women and 8 percentage point deficit among men which. Ultimately, the Gallup poll shows that women have overall supported the Democratic candidate in each election since 1992, that the gender gap is growing

in regard to partisanship, and provides evidence that the gender gap is an important factor in U.S. presidential elections and is in need of further study.

By extending Norris and Inglehart's (2000) study on men and women's party and ideological preferences in advanced industrial societies we can assess whether a modern gender gap with more Leftist leaning women and more Rightist leaning men is persisting or growing more pronounced, and by examining these preferences in developing and post-communist societies it can be determined if continuing development, modernization and establishment as a democracy is resulting in a similar pattern. This research seeks to update and add to the existing study by extending the time period to 2008 cross-nationally and to 2012 in the analysis of the United States. Most importantly, this research seeks to show that not only does societal development or modernization influence partisanship and ideology, but also that the resulting gender gap in partisanship and ideology is a relevant and salient cleavage.

Strong relationships are expected between gender and ideology and gender and partisanship. The multivariate regression analysis may show that women in advanced industrial societies tend to be more Left leaning ideologically and in regard to partisanship than men, and that women in developing and post-communist societies are more Right leaning ideologically and in regard to partisanship than their advanced industrial counter parts. These findings would support the hypotheses and lend additional support and validity to Norris and Inglehart's theory. However, women in post-communist and developing democracies may be slightly more Leftist than they used to be, which only further shows that as modernization and democratic establishment increases, so too does the prominence of liberal ideology and Leftist partisanship

for women. Another possible outcome of the study is that the relationship between gender and partisanship and gender and ideology may turn out to be weaker than previously thought, and perhaps more region specific factors need to be taken into consideration. In this case, the theory would not be generalizable across countries or society types and other avenues would need to be explored.

The organization of the study will be as follows: chapter two will cover the relevant literature pertaining to the gender gap in partisanship and ideology, starting with the traditional gender gap, theories of gender dealignment, theories of gender realignment, and an extended explanation of the developmental theory of the gender gap. Chapter three covers the data and methodology used for the cross-national analysis and the U.S. specific analysis. Chapter four discusses the findings and highlights of the cross-national analysis. Chapter five shows the findings and highlights of the U.S. specific analysis. Chapter six then summarizes the findings, draws conclusions, and explores ideas for future research.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

The Traditional Gender Gap

Historically, women favored and identified with Right wing parties more so than males in Western Democracies, specifically in the U.S. and Western Europe (Durverger 1955; Lipset 1960; Butler and Stokes 1974; Inglehart 1977; Norris and Inglehart 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Dalton 2008). Similarly, Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978) found that men were more politically active than women in the pre-1970s and that these gender differences persisted even after controlling for education, institutional affiliations, and psychological involvement in politics.

Previous explanations and analyses for the phenomenon of the traditional gender gap focused on structural sex differences, like religiosity and labor force participation for example (Norris and Inglehart 2000). Lipset (1960) found that attending churches was highly associated with party preference. Church attendance in general, but specifically among Catholics, was a significant indicator of identification and support for conservative or Christian Democratic parties among women during the 1950s (Norris and Inglehart 2000).

The traditional gender gap, however, began to lose salience and relevance around the 1980s as gender differences in party choice began to change or “dealign”, whereby gender no longer directly indicated partisan or ideological affiliation (Dalton 2008; Norris and Inglehart 2000). By the mid 1990s, the traditional gender gap in electoral turn-out had become insignificant in most advanced industrial societies, however the gap continued to persist in both

post communist and developing societies with Norris and Inglehart (2000) obtaining similar results in regard to partisanship and ideology (Norris 2002; Norris and Evans 1999).

Theories of Gender Dealignment

Gender dealignment, which began in the early 1980s throughout many Western Democracies, can be defined as the point at which sex differences between men and women in regard to party choice and ideology became minimal to non-existent (Norris and Inglehart 2000). The tendency of women to lean Right in regard to partisanship began to waver at this time in Great Britain (Hayes and McAllister, 1997), the Netherlands (Mayer and Smith, 1995), and New Zealand (Vowles, 1993), disrupting the traditional social-party linkages in these post-industrial democracies. The rise of feminism and feminist issues changed the political orientation of some younger women, as parties of the Left developed a compassionate stance on “women’s issues” (Conover 1988). Shortly thereafter voting differences between males and females narrowed, and then reversed with women increasingly supporting parties of the Left (Dalton 2008). The United States however experienced only a brief period of dealignment and quickly shifted to realignment or a change in the bases of party support due to new cultural issues defining ideology in the 1980s (Norris and Inglehart, 2000; Schaffer and Clagget, 1995).

The existing literature is somewhat divided on the presence of dealignment, attributing the change in ideological stances of women to government performance, party policy, or leadership images rather than changes in cultural and structural changes around the 1980s in advanced industrial democracies (Norris and Inglehart 2000). Some scholars found that during the time of alleged “dealignment” that the majority of women in established democracies leaned

Left (Norris 1988), Right (Jelen, Thomas, Wilcox 1994), or were actually no different than their male counterparts (Mayer and Smith 1995). Though the presence of dealignment is often debated, there is much scholarly consensus that a gender realignment did occur throughout the advanced industrial democracies or societies, with its origin as the source of inquiry and debate.

Theories of Gender Realignment

The study performed by Norris and Inglehart (2000) provided the first concrete evidence to support a realignment toward the Left for women throughout advanced industrial societies. Realignment here is defined similarly to how these authors and others describe “partisan realignment”, which is “enduring and stable changes in the mass coalitional basis of party politics” (Norris and Evans, 1999). One example of such an electoral change is that of the African American realignment to the Democratic Party during and after the civil rights era (Black and Black, 1987). The realignment or the resulting gender gap is stable, consistent, and politically significant according to Gallup Poll data on “The Gender Gap in Voting” (Norris and Inglehart 2000; pp 445). This study seeks to provide updated evidence and additional support to the idea of ideological realignment on the basis of gender.

Unfortunately, some available empirical evidence suggests that gender does not sufficiently explain voting patterns. From their study on the “frozen cleavages”, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) assert that gender is secondary in importance and impact when compared to cleavages like social class, religion, and region, but then later decide that sex differences stand out as an influential factor in party politics. In 2008, the difference between men and women in regard to party voting averages less than 10%, which leads skeptics to deny a gap altogether.

Also, in the U.S. presidential elections in 2004, the gender gap was perceived to be modest in comparison to other influences on voter choice (Dalton 2008). However, Norris (1999) points out that significant voting differences do begin to emerge on the bases of gender when combined with life status measures like employment status and occupation type.

Norris and Inglehart (2000) identify two major schools of thought on the potential mechanism causing realignment or the modern gender gap with females supporting parties of the Left more than men. The first is the one adopted by Norris and Inglehart, which claims that structural and cultural trends in advanced industrial and modernized societies, like secularization and the transformation of sex roles, affect the political identity of the electorate and therefore causes female Leftist realignment. The second rejects the notion that all modern societies are facing realignment, but that factors specific to the U.S. like the lack of strong class cleavages, prevalence of two-party competition, and the salience of “women’s issues” like abortion are causing the realignment in the region solely. This study seeks to show evidence of the modern gender gap in both the United States and in other advanced industrial nations, thus supporting the developmental theory of the gender gap.

Box-Steffenmeier, De Boef, Lin (2004) in their study focused on the U.S. have a similar theory to that of Norris and Inglehart (2000), including both societal conditions and politics as driving gender differences in voting, party choice, and ideology. The authors find that from 1980-2000, the gender gap emerged when the political climate became more “conservative”, the economy deteriorated, and when women were the most disadvantaged as the percent of economically vulnerable women increased. However, this theory relies heavily on economic

conditions and uses survey data from CBS News and NY Times, which doesn't explain partisanship and ideological change in other advanced industrial societies.

Another theory of gender realignment focuses on the change in the likelihood of political or voting participation between the sexes rather than partisanship or ideology. Traditional gender differences in voting participation faded during the 1980's and in some cases reversed in many advanced industrial countries (Christy 1987; Norris 2002). In U.S. presidential elections since 1980, the proportion of eligible female adults who voted exceeded the proportion of eligible males who voted, and the same phenomenon is noted in non presidential midterm elections since 1986 (Norris 2002). Norrander (2003) in supporting the U.S. centric view uses CBS and NY Times exit poll data and finds that women are slightly more partisan and identify with the Democratic Party than men. Since women are participating politically more often than males and are identifying increasingly with the Left ideologically and in regard to party preference, a mass realignment could be changing the behavior in the electorate on a large scale across nations.

Next, a cutting edge, but controversial argument about the origin of the gender gap is based on biology and genetics rather than social constructs. Gilligan (1982) supported the psychological perspective that women and men approach this differently, with women's psychology focused on an ethic of care and with men's psychology focused on an ethic of justice. Hatemi, Medland, and Eaves (2009) built upon this idea and studied twins to examine the political preferences between men and women based on biological conditions and genetic influence. Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005) who performed a similar study on twins to

understand political preferences provided “strong” evidence for this argument as did Hatemi, Medland, and Eaves. However, the authors ultimately outlined the inability of separating genetic influences from the environment as a pitfall of the study, which shows that methods need to be perfected in order to further examine such a theory.

Also, race and gender are often studied together to understand the gender gap in the U.S. Kaufmann (2002, 2006) shows that race can often be a more relevant cleavage than gender, with white men and women in the South voting Republican and with African Americans of both sexes voting Democratic. The author actually argues that the gender gap is shrinking and that men are driving the gap by consistently identifying more with the Republican Party while women have more variance in their party preferences. The gender gap actually appears to be a white gender gap, whereby white women are more likely to support the Democratic Party while white men appear to be increasingly supporting the Republican Party. Kaufmann (2002) also includes female specific issues as influencing party identification and finds significant results for both female issues and race.

Another argument about the source of the gender gap examines the importance of the women’s movement and feminism in affecting the vote choice of men and women. In both the U.S. and Western Europe, the women’s movement occurred in the latter half of the 20th Century and made a substantial impact on the political participation levels of women (Dalton 2008). Conover (1988), takes a U.S. centric viewpoint, and also identifies the gap as a result of “the growth of feminist identity” and driven by the women’s movement of gender equality, not post-materialist values of self-expression and freedom as asserted by Norris and Inglehart (2000,

2012). Similarly, Carroll (1987, 1988) provides evidence for mobilization and autonomy theories which shows that women want and seek economic independence and tend to support “female” policy issues (Huddy and Carey, 2009).

Some scholars recognize the modern gender gap and attribute women’s Left leanings to the resource disparities between men and women, specifically in education and income (Burns, 2007). On the contrary, Howell and Day (2000) assert that education has a liberalizing effect on women, with more highly educated women identifying more with parties of the Left. In the U.S., some scholars believe that the gap is due to greater support among women for a wide variety of Leftist issues, not just those that are gender specific ones. The “vulnerability hypothesis” illustrates this and explains that women, being disadvantaged in patriarchal society, will advocate and support social programs that assist all others that are disadvantaged (Schlesinger and Heldman 2001). Also, prior research has focused on sex differences in public opinion in the U.S. on issues like welfare expenditures, pro-environmental protection, and actions of the military in which women have taken more liberal opinions and stances (Erie and Rein, 1988; Page and Shapiro, 1993; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton, 1997).

Critics of gender gap theories in vote choice and ideology often focus on the idea that gender related issues do cut across party lines. According to Dalton (2008), in the U.S. political party positions are clearly stated on most issues, but parties are internally divided on gendered issues like the role of women in the family and in the work place. Similarly, Huddy and Carey (2009) look at the effect of group attachments like gender on vote choice and party identification and find that women have “fragmented” political loyalties and that the gender gap is most

pronounced in elections in which “female” issues are salient. However, in Germany and France, the impact of gender is stronger as Catholic voter blocs and/or Christian parties polarize opinions on such issues. Also, many democracies still do not have any popular women’s parties that appeal exclusively to “women’s issues” like reproduction for example (Howell and Day, 2000). Given the lack of a popular party for females, a gender based cleavage is definitely worthy of analysis in order to better understand vote choice and ideological differences in the electorate.

The Developmental Theory of Gender Realignment

In the U.S., the gender realignment meant that the traditional gap persisted in the 1950s and 1960s, faded in the 1970s, and around the 1980s a new “modern” gender gap emerged which is reflected by women’s Democratic party identification and support in presidential, gubernatorial, and state elections. Norris and Inglehart (2000) also provide evidence in their piece that similar patterns are found in other Western Democracies with women identifying increasingly with parties of the Left. The alignment between the growing support for parties of the Left by females, the modern gender gap, in advanced industrial societies and evidence of the traditional gender gap persisting in post-communist and developing societies provided overwhelming support for the “developmental theory of gender realignment” that Norris and Inglehart (2000) crafted. This study aims to update and extend their findings.

The Developmental Theory essentially states that structural and cultural trends common to advanced industrial societies have realigned women to parties of the Left (Norris and Inglehart 2000). This theory ties in closely with post-modernization theory, which posits that “In advanced industrial societies, the increase of post materialist values in the younger generations

has led to a gradual but steady decline in the class politics of economic and physical security (materialism), opening the way for prioritizing values of freedom, self-expression and gender equality (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997). So, the developmental theory shows that transformation of sex roles in post-industrial societies has influenced the process of value change (Norris and Inglehart 2000). Put another way, structural factors (secularization and modernization) cause and interact with cultural attitudes and values thereby influencing ideology and political party preference.

Examples of this value change in post-industrial or advanced industrial societies can be seen as both men and women are in the workforce, education is readily available for females and more modern or alternative family lifestyles are accepted (Manza and Brooks 1998). In fact, most Americans now support equal opportunities for both men and women, with more traditional sex roles being rejected. This example is illustrated through the point that in 1936 only 22% of Americans approved of married women working compared to an approval rating of over 80% in the 1990's (Dalton 2008).

Traditional or pre-industrial societies on the other hand typically have gender roles that discourage women in the workforce outside of the home and support child bearing and rearing as the female's central goal (Norris and Inglehart 2000). The structural and cultural norms in these regions are reinforced by the present lag in economic and democratic development, which calls for men to stay working and women to maintain a full-time position in the household. For these reasons, it is expected that women in post industrial societies will support parties of the Left and adopt Left ideological stances that reinforce their particular, society specific values while women

in developing, post-communist, and pre industrial societies will continue to support Rightist ideological orientations and traditional parties of the Right.

Additionally, although egalitarian values present in most advanced industrial societies are pushing women to the Left ideologically, the lack of complete equality women face in such societies may be pushing them even further in that direction. For example, currently women make approximately 77 cents to the male \$1 and are more likely to live in poverty than males according to the UN (1995). Also, women are over-represented in low paying jobs of the public sector, like education and health care, which are well known to be treated with compassion by parties of the Left (Norris and Inglehart 2000). Clearly egalitarian values are more prominent in advanced industrial societies, but some of the lingering institutionalized inequality outlined above may contribute to Left orientation of women. So, if modernization does indeed influence the gender gap, then we, like Norris and Inglehart, expect that support for post materialist values is associated with women's support of Leftist parties.

Some scholars recognize the modern gender gap and attribute women's Left leanings to the resource disparities between men and women, specifically in education and income (Burns 2007). For example, Howell and Day (2000) assert that education has a liberalizing effect on women, with more highly educated women identifying more with parties of the Left. In the U.S., some scholars believe that the gap is due to greater support among women for a wide variety of Leftist issues, not just those that are gender specific ones. The "vulnerability hypothesis" illustrates this and explains that women, being disadvantaged in patriarchal society, will advocate and support social programs that assist all others that are disadvantaged (Schlesinger and

Heldman 2001). Also, prior research has focused on sex differences in public opinion in the U.S. on issues like welfare expenditures, pro-environmental protection, and actions of the military in which women have taken more liberal opinions and stances (Erie and Rein 1988; Page and Shapiro 1993; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997).

CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODS

Cross-National Analysis Variables

In order to re-create the analysis by Norris and Inglehart (2000), multivariate regressions are run to test the hypotheses. For the cross-national analysis in chapter four, the data is obtained from the World Values Survey and includes information from 2004 to 2008. The countries are coded by society type, 1 for advanced industrial societies, 2 for post-communist societies, and 3 for developing societies which follows Norris and Inglehart's (2000) classifications and serve as the control variables. While post-communist and developing societies are now more commonly known as less developed countries (LDCs) or newly industrialized countries (NICs) in contemporary comparative and cross-national literature, Norris and Inglehart's classifications are used here for continuity and comparability. The countries included in this study are based on availability in the World Values Survey and inclusion in Norris and Inglehart's study and are the U.S., Great Britain, France, Germany, Australia, Finland, Italy, Japan, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland for the "advanced industrial societies"; Poland, Romania, and the Ukraine for the "post-communist societies"; and India, South Africa, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan, and Turkey for the "developing societies".

The first nine regression models in chapter four are given in the context of society type so the effect of all of the independent variables on ideology can be clearly seen within each society. Then, table 4 chapter 4 shows the gender gap in ideology in every individual country, showing which nations are most affected by this phenomenon.

Dependent Variable

The main dependent variable is ideology, which is a 10-point scale ranging from 1 “most left” to 10 “most right”. In order to gauge ideological preference, respondents were told “In political matters, people talk of the “left” and the “right”. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” While a left-right voting scale is also used as a main dependent variable in Norris and Inglehart’s (2000) study, one is not included as a variable in the cross-national portion of this thesis due to coding issues. While this is a slight downfall in regard to comparing the results of the two studies, ideology is a relevant dependent variable, sometimes used as a proxy for party identification, and will likely provide insight on the gender gap in this regard. In fact, some studies have shown that in the context of cross-national research, the left-right ideological scale is a more valid measurement than the left-right component applied in many multi-party identification scales (Norris and Inglehart 2000).

Independent Variables

The main independent variable is gender, which is a dummy variable coded 0 for males and 1 for females. The other independent variables are “social structure” operationalized as religiosity, socioeconomic status/ occupational status, employment status, age, and education and “cultural attitudes” operationalized by support for the women’s movement and post-materialism. The coding for the “social structure” variables are as follows: religiosity is a 7- point scale coded 1 for frequently attending religious services to 7 never attending religious services. Respondents were asked “Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services?” Socioeconomic or occupational status is a 9-point scale coded 1 for unskilled workers to 9 professional workers. Respondents were asked “In which profession/occupation do

you work?” Employment status is a dummy variable coded 1 for full-time, part-time, or self employed and 0 as all others. Age is operationalized as continuous years. Education is a 9-point scale coded 1 for no formal education to 9 university level with degree. Respondents were asked “What is the highest educational level that you have attained?”

The cultural attitudes operationalizations are as follows: the support for the women’s movement measure is a 4-point scale with 1 as no confidence at all in the women’s movement to 4 quite a lot of confidence in the movement. Respondents were told, “I am going to name a number of organizations and for each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them?” The post-materialism measure is a 4-point index coded 1 as identifying with no identification, 2 as materialist, 3 as mixed, and 4 as post-materialist. Again, the coding is based on Norris and Inglehart’s (2000) study for comparability purposes. These variables represent the structural and cultural factors that influence ideology based on the findings of Norris and Inglehart (2000) and are therefore appropriate for this analysis.

The first three tables in chapter 4 or the cross-national chapter display the 9 regression models that test hypotheses 1 through 3. Table 1 includes models 1-3, displaying the regressions for the advanced industrial societies, Table 2 includes models 4-6 and displays the regressions for the post-communist societies, and Table 3 includes models 7-9 and shows the regressions for the developing societies. Models 1, 4, and 7 test the effect of gender alone on ideology, models 2, 5, and 8 test the effect of gender and the social structure variables on ideology, and models 3, 6, and 9 test the effect of gender, social structure, and cultural attitudes on ideology while

controlling for region. Table 4 shows regressions testing the effect of gender, social structure, and cultural attitudes on ideology across all nations, further testing hypotheses 1 through 3.

U.S. Specific Analysis Variables

In chapter 5, multivariate regressions will again be employed for an in depth analysis of the relationship between gender and partisanship and gender and ideology in the United States. The regression models including decades from the 1970s to the 2000s utilize variables from the American National Election Studies (ANES) cumulative file, while models from year 2012 use data from the ANES 2012 Cross Section Study. The 2012 Cross Section includes both face to face and web based respondents. Also, in the 2000's decade, only years 2000, 2004, and 2008 are included in the regressions as there was no ANES in 2006 or 2010 and the 2002 ANES has an exceptionally small N.

First, table 5 shows the effects of gender on party identification in the U.S. by decade, from the 1970s until 2012 and table 6 shows the effects of gender on ideology in the U.S. by decade from the 1970s until 2012. The purpose of these models is to test hypothesis 4 which asserts that women in the U.S. are more likely to identify with liberal ideology and the Democratic Party than men. The regression models in tables 5 and 6 control for social structure and cultural attitudes although the findings for those variables are not reported in the tables. This portion of the analysis, unlike the previous cross-national models in this study, will include party identification as a dependent variable. Analyzing partisanship and ideological patterns over a span of decades, starting in the 1970s, should paint a portrait of how the gender gap has changed over time and help guide theorists in predicting how it will look in the future.

Dependent Variables

The two main dependent variables in this analysis are party identification and ideology and they are coded similarly in the cumulative file and the time series study. Party identification is operationalized as a self-placement 7-point scale ranging from 1 “Strong Democrat”, 2 “Weak Democrat”, 3 “Independent-Democrat”, 4 “Independent”, 5 “Independent-Republican”, 6 “Weak Republican”, to 7 “Strong Republican”. Ideology is operationalized as a self-placement 7-point scale ranging from 1 “Extremely Liberal”, 2 “Liberal”, 3 “Slightly Liberal”, 4 “Moderate”, 5 “Slightly Conservative”, 6 “Conservative”, to 7 “Extremely Conservative”. Because these dependent variables were employed in Norris and Inglehart’s (2000) analysis, comparing these findings to theirs as well as to those in chapter 4 of this piece will be more parsimonious and logical.

Independent Variables

The main independent variable in these models is gender, coded 1 for females and 0 for males for both the cumulative file and time series data sets. Again, social structure and cultural attitude measures are utilized in conjecture with Norris and Inglehart’s study. The “social structure” variables are operationalized as race, age, religiosity, employment, education, marital status, and the “cultural attitude” variable is abortion.

The coding for the “social structure” variables is as follows: race is coded 1 for whites and 0 for all other races, as the gender gap is often considered to be a “white gender gap”, with other races, specifically African Americans, voting in solidarity regardless of sex (Kauffman 2002, 2006). Additionally, Judis and Texeira (2002) explain that the most democratic groups are

college educated females and minorities, further showing that the gender gap appears to apply specifically the whites and justifying the exclusion of other races in this study. Because African Americans, both male and female, in the U.S. tend to identify with the Democratic Party and with liberal ideology, the gap would be diminished by including this group in the analyses.

Age is operationalized through continuous years in the cumulative file dataset but is used a twelve point scale of age groups in the 2012 times series data. The age groups are coded 1 for age 17-20, 2 for 21-24, 3 for 25-29, 4 for 30-34, 5 for 35-39, 6 for 40-44, 7 for 45-49, 8 for 50-54, 9 for 55-59, 10 for 60-64, 11 for 65-69, and 12 for 70+.

Religiosity is operationalized similarly in both ANES data sets and is church or religious attendance which is a 5-point scale ranging from 1 never attending religious services to 5 attending every week.

Employment is operationalized as 1 being employed currently and 0 currently not employed, as comparing just the employed to the not employed will provide more clear and definitive results than including each categorical group. The not employed category includes those that are disabled, retired, students, homemakers, and those that are temporarily laid off.

Education in the ANES cumulative file is coded 1 for grade school or less, 2 for high-school (non-college), 3 for some college (no degree), and 4 for college degree or higher, while education in the 2012 time series is coded 1 for less than high-school credential, 2 for highschool credential, 3 for some post high-school (no bachelor's degree), and 4 bachelor's degree and higher.

The marital status measure is coded 1 for those who are married and 0 for the unmarried. The unmarried category includes those who are divorced, widowed, separated, and never married. Putting all unmarried respondents in one category rather than distinguishing between them makes for a more clear comparison and is appropriate for this particular analysis.

The “cultural attitude” variable used in the analysis of the United States is abortion attitudes. Unfortunately the ANES data sets do not have workable women’s movement or materialism/post-materialism measures so abortion attitudes will have to be used as a proxy. From the 1950s through the 1970s respondents were asked, “When should abortion be allowed?” and from the 1980s into 2012 respondents were asked “By law, when should abortion be allowed?” This change was implemented after the decision in *Roe v. Wade* (1973) legalizing abortion in the U.S. citing the right to privacy in the due process clause of the 14th amendment. The changing of the question wording to include “by law” can potentially influence the way respondents answer and think about questions, therefore the distinction between the abortion variables must be taken into consideration. Abortion attitudes is operationalized as a four point scale ranging from 1 “a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion”, 2 “abortions should be permitted for other or personal reasons such as health related reasons”, 3 “abortions should only be permitted in the case of rape”, 4 “abortion should never be permitted”.

There are also two contextual variables; the Northeast and the South. The Northeast is coded 1 for the northeastern states and 0 for all other states. The northeastern states are Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The South is coded 1 for the South and 0 for all others. The

southern states included in the South variable are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Washington D.C., Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina and South Carolina. Other regions excluded and coded as 0 are the western and the north central states.

Finally, Table 7 shows the effects of gender on party identification in the Northeast and table 8 shows the effects of gender on ideology in the Northeast. These tables test hypothesis 6 which asserts that women in the northeast are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and liberal ideology than their male counterparts. Table 9 shows the effect of gender on party identification in the south and table 10 shows the effect of gender on ideology in the south. These tables test hypothesis 5 which asserts that women in the south are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and liberal ideology than their male counterparts. The regressions in tables 7-10 control for social structure and cultural attitudes, though the findings for all of those independent variables are not reported in the tables.

Recent studies have found that Democratic gains in the Northeast have been offset by and occur in conjecture with increasing Republican Party identification in the South (Black and Black 2008). Judis and Texiera (2002) and Schaller (2006) claim that the Democratic stronghold in the Northeast and Western regions lay the geographic foundation of an emerging Democratic majority. Given that the northeast and south have distinct and prominent partisan majorities, it will be interesting to see if the modern gender gap persists in these regions, particularly in the Republican south. Therefore, an analysis of the gender gap in regard to ideology and partisanship by region will add to the literature on partisanship and ideology in the United States.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS

Table 1: The Effects of Gender on Left-Right Ideology Scale in Advanced Industrial Societies, 2004-2008

	Model 1 Gender Only	Model 2 Gender + social Structure	Model 3 Gender + social Structure + cultural Attitudes
Gender	-.17**	-.22**	-.14**
<i>Social Structure</i>			
Religiosity		-.13**	-.12**
Socioeconomic Status		.00**	.00**
Age		.05**	.05**
Education		.00	.04**
Employment Status (Employed)		.00	.01
<i>Attitudes</i>			
Post Materialism			-.37**
Support for women's Movement			.28**
Adj. R Squared	.00	.03	.09
N	15,348	14,985	13,310
Standard Error	.03	.03	.03

Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients representing the impact of the independent variables on the ideological scale; 1=most left, 10=most right. Constant not reported.

*p<.10 **p<.05

Source: World Values Survey 1981-2008

Table 1 displays the results of the multivariate regressions testing hypothesis 1, that a modern gender gap is persisting in advanced industrial societies. The relationship between ideology and gender is significant (-.17**) and in the expected direction, in model 1 without controls. Gender remains significant even when controlling for social structure measures alone in model 2 (-.22**) and with social structure and cultural attitude measures together in model 3 (-.14**). These models show that not only do women prefer the left ideologically in advanced

industrial societies, but also shows that gender is a strong and significant predictor of ideological preference thus validating the hypothesis 1. In model 1, the adjusted r-squared is low, at (.00), meaning that 0% of the variation in ideology is explained by gender which is somewhat puzzling.

Surprisingly, employment status had little effect in both models 2 and 3, while the other social structure measures did. However, Norris and Inglehart similarly found that paid employment had a weak impact on the gender-ideology relationship in their regression models displaying the effects of gender on the left-right voting scale in the 1990's. The findings in their social structures model and the social structures + cultural attitudes model were modest and insignificant at a coefficient of .02 (Norris and Inglehart 2000). Another interesting find is that socioeconomic status appears to be significant in both models 2 and 3 although the regression coefficient is a low .00. This means for every one unit increase in socioeconomic status, there is a "significant" .00 unit increase in ideological preference which is puzzling and a bit counter-intuitive.

The pattern of the gender gap as influenced by post materialism (-.37**) and support for the women's movement (.28**) proved to be highly significant, which lends support to the findings of Norris and Inglehart (2000) that the gender gap is strongly the product of cultural attitudinal variables rather than structural measures alone. Interestingly, the relationships are in opposite directions with post-materialist values indicating support for Leftist ideological views among women while support for the women's movement actually indicates support for Right ideological alignment. Norris and Inglehart conversely showed the relationship between post-

materialism and ideology and confidence in the women's movement and ideology to be in the same direction and indicative of alignment to the Left.

All of the independent variables proved to have a significant impact on ideology with the exception of employment in models 2 and 3 and education in model 2. The age variable shows some polarization with older respondents identifying with the right as predicted. Also, those with low religious attendance appear to lean left which aligns with modernization theory and the materialist/post-materialist argument. The adjusted r-squared in model 2 shows that 3% of the variation in ideology is explained by the social structure variables and the adjusted r-squared in model 3 shows that 9% of the variation in ideology is explained by both social structure and cultural attitude variables. While the adjusted r squared values are reported and noted, the unstandardized regression coefficients are the main focus and reference for gauging significance throughout the thesis.

Table 2: The Effects of Gender on Left-Right Ideology Scale in Post-Communist Societies, 2004-2008

	Model 4 Gender Only	Model 5 Gender + social Structure	Model 6 Gender + social Structure + cultural Attitudes
Gender	.02	-.01	-.05
<i>Social Structure</i>			
Religiosity		-.10**	-.09**
Socioeconomic Status		.00	.01**
Age		.00	.01
Education		.04*	.01
Employment Status (Employed)		.07	.12**
<i>Attitudes</i>			
Post Materialism			-.01
Support for women's Movement			.02
Adj. R Squared	.00	.01	.00
N	2,226	2,162	1,764
Standard Error	.09	.10	.11

Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients representing the impact of the independent variables on the ideological scale; 1=most left, 10=most right. Constant not reported.

*p<.10 **p<.05

Source: World Values Survey 1981-2008

Next, table 2 which shows the effects of gender on the left-right ideology scale mostly supports hypothesis 2 that women in post-communist societies are more likely to hold more traditional and Rightist ideological views. While gender alone is not a significant predictor of ideology in post-communist societies as seen in model 4, the value (.02) is in the expected direction. This lack of significance could be due to the fact that only three countries are in the post-communist category, although the N is still pretty high at 2,226.

Once social structure measures are introduced in model 5, religiosity proves to have a significant effect (-.10**), while gender remains insignificant. As expected, post material attitudes and support for the women's movement had no significant effect on ideology, showing that women retain traditional values in this region and continue align to the Right ideologically in this regard. However, it is worth noting that the relationship between ideology and gender reverses and becomes negative in model 6 when controlling for gender and social structure at (-.05), which shows that a slow transformation toward the Left can be observed. Perhaps women in post-communist societies are in the early stages of integrating Leftist ideologies as democracy and its modernizing affect becomes more ingrained and persists in those regions.

Interestingly, education appears to be an insignificant factor with a coefficient of .00 in model 5 and .01 in model 6 while Norris and Inglehart (2000) found it to be a significant factor in their evaluation of the gender gap in post-communist societies. Similarly, their findings for the age and employment measurements are insignificant as are the findings here.

Table 3: The Effects of Gender on Left-Right Ideology Scale in Developing Societies, 2004-2008

	Model 7 Gender Only	Model 8 Gender + social Structure	Model 9 Gender + social Structure + cultural Attitudes
Gender	.10**	.02	.03
<i>Social Structure</i>			
Religiosity		-.05**	-.05**
Socioeconomic Status		.00*	.00**
Age		.03*	.00
Education		-.07**	-.06**
Employment Status (Employed)		.01	.00
<i>Attitudes</i>			
Post Materialism			-.15**
Support for women's Movement			.04
Adj. R Squared	.00	.01	.01
N	9,887	9,661	8,781
Standard Error	.05	.05	.05

Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients representing the impact of the independent variables on the ideological scale; 1=most left, 10=most right. Constant not reported.

*p<.10 **p<.05

Source: World Values Survey 1981-2008

Table 3 which shows the effects of gender on ideology in developing societies also lends support to hypothesis 3, that women are more likely to adopt right, traditional ideological stances in developing societies. Model 7 shows that not only is gender is a significant predictor of ideology at (.10*), but also that women in developing societies tend to lean right ideologically in comparison to their advanced industrial counterparts. The adjusted r-squared for model 7 is low, at (.00). However, when the social structure controls are introduced in model 8, the relationship

becomes insignificant at .02 and remains insignificant in model 9 at .03 when cultural attitudes are also introduced.

Age and employment status appear to have little effect on ideology in models 8 and 9. This finding is interesting because age seems to play a significant role in ideology in advanced industrial societies according to table 1. Norris and Inglehart (2000) explain that in advanced industrial societies, older generations of women tend to be more Conservative or lean Right while younger women tend to lean Left. Perhaps the lack of an established, long-running democracy in the developing countries along with previously established cultural norms leads to a lack of significance or lack of difference between the ages in regard to ideology.

Religiosity and education again show to be significant factors in impacting the nature of the gender gap. Model 9 which also includes the cultural attitudes controls flips the relationship back to the direction of model 7 though not significantly. Post material values seem to be driving this gap as this measure is significant (-.15**), which indicates that the values of women in developing societies could be getting closer to that of women in advanced industrial societies, thus impacting their ideological stances. Confidence in the women's movement has only a modest effect on ideology at (.04).

Overall, the modern gender gap is strongest and most prevalent in advanced industrialized societies as hypothesized. The gender gap does not appear to be strong or significant in all three post-communist models, which was expected. However, the gap is significant in developing societies before social structure and cultural attitude variables are introduced, with women leaning to the right as hypothesized. When comparing the overall effect

of the independent variables on ideology, developing countries and advanced industrial countries are the most similar. For example, post-materialist attitudes have a strong, negative relationship with ideology in both developing and advanced industrial societies. This finding may indicate that in terms of cultural attitudes and social characteristics these societies are moving in the same direction, with developing societies possibly mirroring the gender gap as observed in advanced industrial societies in the future.

Also, the impact of religiosity on ideology is significant and directionally similar in advanced industrial, post-communist, and developing societies, which is an interesting find. Clearly, the relationship between religious attendance and ideology plays an important role in the gender gap, as the religious affiliations of men and women will bear great influence on their ideological leanings. Another observation is that education plays a significant role in ideological affiliation in developing societies, but not in post-communist societies. As democracy as a political institution and permanent regime persists in these societies, perhaps the effect of education on ideological leanings will become more uniform and similar to each other and to that of advanced industrial societies.

Table 4: The Effect of Gender on Ideology in Advanced Industrialized, Post-Communist, and Developing Societies by Country, 2004-2008

	Gender Effect	Standard Error	Adj. R-Squared	N
<u><i>Advanced Industrial</i></u>				
Australia	-.18**	.06	.10	2869
Canada	-.08	.07	.05	2921
Finland	.01	.10	.08	1480
France	.08	.14	.08	1001
Germany	-.35**	.07	.09	2375
Great Britain	.04	.14	.07	2134
Italy	-.17*	.17	.12	1012
Japan	-.10	.10	.07	1274
Netherlands	-.21*	.15	.10	1050
Norway	-.26**	.08	.09	1969
Spain	-.03	.07	.14	2539
Sweden	-.11	.09	.20	1687
Switzerland	-.40**	.09	.16	1738
U.S.	-.08*	.06	.10	3280
<u><i>Post-Communist</i></u>				
Poland	-.01*	.18	.07	3091
Romania	-.16	.13	.01	3015
Ukraine	-.16	.11	.03	3811
<u><i>Developing</i></u>				
Argentina	-.07	.09	.08	1694
Brazil	-.07	.11	.01	2186
Chile	.20**	.09	.04	2107
India	.10	.14	.03	2369
Mexico	-.03	.09	.02	3672
South Africa	-.23**	.06	.02	6365
Taiwan	.28**	.09	.04	1869
Turkey	.71**	.10	.14	4246

Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients representing the impact of the independent variables (including social structure and cultural attitude variables) on the ideological scale; 1=most left, 10=most right. Constant not reported.

*p<.10 **p<.05 Source: World Values Survey 1981-2008

Finally, table 4 displays the effects of gender on ideology by nation in order to show which countries are actually experiencing a gender gap. Based on the models, every advanced industrialized nation included above is experiencing a modern gender gap with women leaning to

the Left ideologically, except for Finland, France, and Great Britain. The gap is particularly significant in Australia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States. These findings differ somewhat from Norris and Inglehart's analysis of the gender gap in voting in the 1990's, as their results suggest that the gap was significant in all advanced industrial nations with women leaning Left. However, ideology is the dependent variable in this analysis rather than vote choice, which may explain the variation or differences between the findings.

All three post-communist nations, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine showed evidence of an emerging modern gender gap. In Poland, women leaned toward the Left significantly more than men at $(-.01^*)$. Next, the findings for the developing nations were the most diverse with the greatest variations. Women are leaning more to the Left than men in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico and this effect is significant in South Africa $(-.23^{**})$. In Chile, Taiwan, and Turkey women are leaning to the Right significantly. Also, women appear to be leaning to the Right in India however this finding is modest and not significant. Ultimately, these regression models show which specific countries are driving the gender gap, either modern or traditional, in their respective societal types.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE U.S. SPECIFIC ANALYSIS

Table 5: The Effects of Gender on Party Identification in the U.S. by Decade

	1970's	1980's	1990's	2000's	2012
Gender	-.04	-.12**	-.29**	-.35**	-.08
<i>Social Structure</i>					
Race	-1.29**	-1.57**	-1.56**	-1.82**	-2.26**
Age	.01**	-.00**	-.01**	-.01**	.00
Religiosity	.01	.04**	.08**	.11**	.10**
Employment	-.11**	.06	-.08*	-.02	.19**
Education	.31**	.22**	.26**	.17**	.15**
Marital Status	.12**	.06	.15**	.31**	.30**
<i>Cultural Attitudes</i>					
Abortion	-.01	.03**	.16**	.21**	.49**
Adj. R Squared	.07	.09	.11	.16	.27
N	6653	9116	8852	3738	3282
Standard Error	.05	.04	.04	.06	.06

Source: ANES Cumulative file and 2012 ANES Cross-Section

Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients representing the impact of the independent variables on the 7-point party identification scale, 1= strong Dem, 7= Strong Rep. Constant not reported.

*p<.10 **p<.05

Table 4, showing the effects of gender on party identification in the United States lends support to hypothesis 4 which claims that women are increasingly identifying with the Democratic Party (and liberal ideology). From the 1970's to 2012, an overall trend of women

leaning toward the Democratic Party can be observed. The effect of gender on party identification is significant in the 1980's to the 2000's, but modest in the 1970's and in 2012. Because the modern gender gap was not recognized in the U.S. until the 1980's the lack of significance of the gap in the 1970's comes as no surprise. However, the findings for 2012 are surprising and interesting, as the gap should intuitively increase in strength over time. The lack of significance of the gender gap in 2012 could be explained by the significant effect of other variables on party identification. In fact, all of the cultural attitude and social structure variables, with the exception of the age measure, appear to be significant indicators of party preference.

Some other interesting but intuitive findings are that the effect of race remains significant throughout the decades with African Americans identifying overwhelmingly with the Democratic Party. Also, high church attendance, high education levels, being married, and being pro-life are all indicative of Republican Party support. While this finding is logical given that the Republican Party appeals to Americans with value and moral systems that align with these particular views, their strong effect on party identification over decades is worth noting. Next, the effect of gender on ideology will be explored and compared to these findings on the nature of the gender gap in the United States.

Table 6: The Effects of Gender on Ideology in the U.S. by Decade

	1970's	1980's	1990's	2000's	2012
Gender	-.04	-.13**	-.23**	-.29**	-.05
<i>Social Structure</i>					
Race	-.93**	-.39**	-.41**	-.33**	-.57**
Age	.01**	.00**	.00**	.01**	.04**
Religiosity	.12**	.11**	.15**	.15**	.12**
Employment	.00	.06*	.06	.04	.09
Education	-.02	.02	-.09**	-.04	.01
Marital Status	.21**	.24**	.24**	.29**	.19**
<i>Cultural Attitudes</i>					
Abortion	.05**	.11**	.18**	.27**	.40**
Adj. R Squared	.10	.12	.13	.12	.17
N	4418	6323	6638	2155	3012
Standard Error	.06	.05	.05	.09	.05

Source: ANES Cumulative file and 2012 ANES Cross-Section

Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients representing the impact of the independent variables on the 7-point ideological scale, 1= Extremely Lib, 7=Extremely Con. Constant not reported.

*p<.10 **p<.05

Table 6 shows the effect of gender on ideology by decade from the 1970s to 2012 and shows that the United States, as an advanced industrial society, is experiencing a modern gender gap thus supporting hypothesis 4. The gender gap behaves similarly in regard to ideology and partisanship even when controlling for cultural attitudes and social structure, with an observably significant effect of gender on ideology in the 1980's to the 2000's.

Unfortunately, the effect of gender is insignificant in 2012 at (-.05) just like the effect of gender in 2012 on partisanship. In both tables 5 and 6 abortion appears to have an increasingly strong effect on the dependent variables, which suggests that the effect of abortion may be washing out the effect of gender. Perhaps abortion attitudes are more polarizing, relevant, and salient with time in the United States. The strong effects of race and marital status cannot be discounted as contributing to the insignificant effect of gender in 2012, however the effects of race and marital status do not appear to be increasing in strength dramatically as the abortion effect does.

Age has a greater effect on ideology from the 1970's to 2012 than it did on partisanship. Older age indicates support for conservatism according to table 6, which is intuitive. Religiosity also has a significant effect on ideology similar to that of party identification, with higher church attendance indicating conservative ideological affiliation. Furthermore, the strength of the effect of religious attendance shows the significance and relevance of religion in the United States and its institutions, particularly partisan and electoral institutions. Also, just as high religious attendance, being married, and being pro-life indicated Republican Party preference, these cultural and social attitudes also indicate a preference for conservative ideology.

Table 7: The Effects of Gender on Party Identification in the Northeastern U.S.

	1970's	1980's	1990's	2000's	2012
Gender	-.10	-.10	-.16*	-.41**	-.18
<i>Social Structure</i>					
Race	-1.09**	-1.68**	-1.44**	-1.15**	-2.05**
Age	.01	.00	.00	.00	-.05*
Religiosity	.00	.02	.05	.10*	-.01
Employment	-.10	.04	-.07	-.03	-.29
Education	.19**	.17**	.15**	-.02	-.16**
Marital Status	.22**	.15	.24**	.53**	.93**
<i>Cultural Attitudes</i>					
Abortion	-.03	.01	.13**	.21**	.41**
Adj. R Squared	.04	.09	.08	.10	.22
N	1470	1700	1527	583	529
Standard Error	.10	.09	.10	.15	.17

Source: ANES Cumulative file and 2012 ANES Cross-Section

Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients representing the impact of the independent variables on the 7-point party identification scale, 1= strong Dem, 7= Strong Rep. Constant not reported.

*p<.10 **p<.05

Table 7 addresses hypothesis 6 which claims that women in the northeast tend to identify with the Democratic Party (and Liberal ideology) more than men and the findings mostly support this claim. Overall, women appear to be leaning toward the Democratic Party in the Northeast from the 1970's to 2012. The effect of gender on party identification is significant in the 1990's and 2000's and like the models including the entire U.S., significance fades in 2012.

One interesting finding is that the age measurement has not effect on party identification from the 1970's to the 2000's and then in 2012, it has a significant affect at $(-.05^*)$. This result indicates that younger people identify more with the Democratic Party in the northeast, which provides support for the developmental theory of the gender gap. Also, religiosity or religious attendance has little effect on partisanship in the northeast as it only appears to be significant in the 2000's which differs from the findings on the entire U.S. The effect of education on party identification in the northeast also differs from that of the whole U.S. in that high levels of education indicate Republican Party affiliation in the northeast until the 2000's and in 2012, higher education actually becomes a significant indicator of Democratic Party affiliation at $(-.16^{**})$.

While the effect of some of the social structure variables on partisanship in the northeast defects from the situation of the entire U.S. in the aforementioned ways, some independent variables have a similar effect on partisanship in the U.S. and in the northeast. For example, the abortion attitude effect increases in significance and size in both the northeast and the U.S. Also, the marital status effect maintains significance and a similar relationship directionally, with married women leaning toward the Republican Party, in the northeast like in the U.S. as a whole.

Table 8: The Effects of Gender on Ideology in the Northeastern U.S. by Decade

	1970's	1980's	1990's	2000's	2012
Gender	-.10	-.25**	-.36**	-.49**	-.14
<i>Social Structure</i>					
Race	-.55**	-.51**	-.28**	-.29**	-.37*
Age	.01*	.00	.00	.01**	-.01
Religiosity	-.03	.09**	.11**	.12**	.03
Employment	-.06	.11	-.04	.33*	-.12
Education	-.69**	.02	-.15**	-.19**	-.07
Marital Status	.21	.21**	.17**	.18	.32**
<i>Cultural Attitudes</i>					
Abortion	.15**	.11**	.10**	.31**	.45**
Adj. R Squared	.10	.07	.08	.15	.17
N	1326	1231	1201	328	490
Standard Error	.14	.12	.11	.23	.12

Source: ANES Cumulative file and 2012 ANES Cross-Section

Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients representing the impact of the independent variables on the 7-point ideological scale, 1= strong Dem, 7= Strong Rep. Constant not reported.

*p<.10 **p<.05

Table 8 also looks at the northeast but shows the effects of gender on ideology rather than partisanship. Like the findings in table 7, the findings in table 8 support the hypothesis that women in the northeast are more liberal (and Democratic) than their male counterparts. In fact, the effect of gender on ideology is stronger and more significant over time than the effect of gender on partisanship in the northeast, as the effect is significant with women leaning toward

liberal ideological affiliations from the 1980's to the 1990's. Like in previous models, the effect of gender is insignificant in the 1970's and in 2012 which is not surprising

Race and abortion attitudes remain significant predictors of ideological affiliation from the 1970's to 2012. From the 1980's to the 2000's, high religious attendance has a significant effect on ideology while this effect was only significant in the 2000's on partisanship in the northeast which is an interesting find. This shows that religiosity is an important predictor of ideology in the U.S. but perhaps less important when looking at only partisanship. Another difference between ideology and partisanship in the northeast pertains to the effect of education. High levels of education indicate liberal ideological leanings in the 1970's, 1990's, and 2000's while high levels of education actually indicate conservative leanings in these decades. However, in the 2000's, the effect of education party identification in the northeast does reverse.

While employment has little effect on ideology and partisanship overall in the northeast, in the 2000's employment had a significant effect on ideology at (.33*). This indicates that at this time those who were employed held conservative ideological preferences. The differences in the effects of the independent variables on ideology and partisanship in one region are interesting and enhance the importance of looking at both dependent variables to better gauge the attitudes of the electorate or just citizens in general. Next, tables 9 and 10 show the effects of gender on ideology and party identification in the south and provides comparisons to the effects in the northeast.

Table 9: The Effects of Gender on Party Identification in the Southern U.S. by Decade

	1970's	1980's	1990's	2000's	2012
Gender	-.07	-.16**	-.28**	-.39**	-.04
<i>Social Structure</i>					
Race	-.97**	-1.28**	-1.47**	-2.05**	-2.58**
Age	-.01**	-.01**	-.02**	-.01**	-.01
Religiosity	.04	-.01	.07**	.07**	.06
Employment	-.14	-.02	-.03	-.08	.22*
Education	.22**	.20**	.30**	.24**	.13**
Marital Status	.03	-.07	-.04	.40**	.32**
<i>Cultural Attitudes</i>					
Abortion	.06**	.02	.16**	.15**	.41**
Adj. R Squared	.07	.10	.15	.25	.37
N	1770	2790	2895	1341	1187
Standard Error	.09	.07	.07	.10	.10

Source: ANES Cumulative file and 2012 ANES Cross-Section

Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients representing the impact of the independent variables on the 7-point party identification scale, 1= strong Dem, 7= Strong Rep. Constant not reported.

*p<.10 **p<.05

Table 9 shows the effects of gender on party identification in the south and provides support for hypothesis5 which claims that women in the south are increasingly identifying with the Democratic Party regardless of the Republican stronghold in this region. From the 1970's to 2012, a distinct trend can be observed of women leaning toward the Democratic Party which

closely mirrors the effect that is taking place in the northeast. From the 1980's to the 2000's, this effect is significant and especially surprising since the effect of gender on partisanship was not significant in the 1980's in the predominately Democratic northeast.

Like previous regression models, race and abortion attitudes maintain a significant effect on party identification. Throughout the decades, education has had a consistently strong effect party identification in the south, with higher education indicating Republican Party affiliation. Age also has a significant effect on partisanship from the 1970's to 2000's with younger people preferring the Democratic Party.

Surprisingly, religiosity is only significant in the 1990's to the 2000's with high religious attendance indicating Republican Party affiliation in these decades. In the northeast, religious attendance is a significant predictor of ideology over a longer span of time from the 1980's to the 2000's regardless of the fact that the northeast is considered to be the more secular of the two regions. Still, the most relevant finding this table provides is that women are continuing to increasingly identify with the Democratic Party in the south regardless of the prominence of the Republican Party in this region.

Table 10: The Effects of Gender on Ideology in Southern U.S. by Decade

	1970's	1980's	1990's	2000's	2012
Gender	-.05	-.09	-.25**	-.25**	-.07
<i>Social Structure</i>					
Race	1.12**	-.44**	-.41**	-.37**	-.66**
Age	.01**	.00**	.00*	.00	.03**
Religiosity	.12**	.14**	.17**	.18**	.17**
Employment	-.12	.09	-.07	-.09	.04
Education	.02	.00	-.07**	.01	-.01
Marital Status	.21**	.19**	.14**	.29**	.30**
<i>Cultural Attitudes</i>					
Abortion	.07**	.10**	.15**	.23**	.29**
Adj. R Squared	.14	.07	.10	.13	.17
N	1075	1697	1930	1075	1076
Standard Error	.06	.09	.08	.10	.08

Source: ANES Cumulative file and 2012 ANES Cross-Section

Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients representing the impact of the independent variables on the 7-point ideological scale, 1= Extremely Lib, 7= Extremely Con. Constant not reported.

*p<.10 **p<.05

Finally, table 10 shows the effects of gender on ideology in the south by decade and also confirms the claim of hypothesis 5, that women in the south are more liberal (and more Democratic) than their male counterparts in the region. From the 1970's to 2012, women are leaning toward liberal ideological affiliation in the south. Furthermore, in the 1990's to the

2000's this effect is significant just as the effect of gender on party identification in the south is significant during these decades.

Following suit with the previous regression findings, abortion and race measures have a significant effect on ideology over time. Age, marital status, and religiosity also maintain significance throughout time in the south, with older respondents, married respondents and respondents with high church attendance leaning toward conservative ideological affiliations. Many of the independent variables have similar effects on ideology in the south and in the northeast which is particularly interesting given how polarized the regions are widely considered to be.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Cross-National Conclusions and Implications

All in all, the findings in chapters 4 mostly support the hypotheses that (1) women in advanced industrial societies are more likely to identify with Leftist ideology than men and (3) women in developing societies are more likely to identify with ideologies of the Right than that of their post-industrial counterparts. Once social structure and cultural attitude measures were introduced in the post-communist models, women actually appeared to lean left which does not support hypothesis (2) that women in post-communist societies are more likely to identify with Rightist ideology than their male counterparts. Also, Table 4 which displayed regression models of the effects of gender on ideology in each individual nation provided further insight on the specific countries that are driving the modern gender gap and which nations continue to maintain a traditional one. These findings in the extension of Norris and Inglehart's (2000) study lend additional support to the developmental theory of the gender gap in ideology on a cross-national level.

The modern gender gap was less evident in post-communist and developing societies as predicted with women leaning toward a Rightist ideological orientation significantly in developing societies before social structure and cultural attitude measures were introduced and women actually leaning left in post-communist societies after the introduction of controls. In both cases, the findings were mostly modest and insignificant. However, post-communist societies actually showed evidence of going through a secular realignment characterized by women moving toward the Left ideologically. This phenomenon occurring in post-communist

societies provides further evidentiary support to Norris and Inglehart's notion of the developmental theory of the gender gap in that an established democratic regime along with secularization impacts ideology and party identification in a predictable way. This finding also implies that a greater focus should be placed on post-communist countries and developing ones as well in this line of research to better gauge the strength of the gender gap and the validity of the developmental theory.

Another important finding was the significant effect of post-materialist values and confidence in the women's movement on ideology in advanced industrial nations. As posited in the developmental theory of the gender gap, cultural and social trends unique to advanced industrial societies realign women to the left ideologically. Because these post-materials values and confidence in the women's movement had such a substantial impact on ideological orientation in these societies, this study provides support to the developmental theory in this regard. Moreover, the results in chapter 4 certainly add to the literature on ideology and the gender gap through this extension of Norris and Inglehart's (2000) study to 2008.

U.S. Specific Conclusion and Implications

Next, in chapter 5 the presence of the modern gender gap is tested in the United States with an overall trend of women leaning toward Liberal ideology and toward the Democratic Party for over four decades, adding support to hypothesis (4) which claims that women in the U.S. are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and liberal ideology than their male counterparts. From the 1980's to the 2000's gender had a significant effect on ideology and partisanship. Unfortunately, the gender gap was modest in the 1970's and 2012, but these

understated findings may be explained by the strong and significant effect of other variables like abortion attitudes. Regardless of this setback, an overall trend toward women adopting Liberal ideological stances and identifying with the Democratic Party can be seen over time even with the introduction of social structure and cultural attitude controls. These findings add to the literature on ideology, partisanship, and the gender gap in the United States by providing findings that span from the 1970s to 2012 in support of the developmental theory. By including a number of social and cultural control variables, the findings are robust and show evidence of an increasingly relevant gender gap worthy of further study.

In testing the gender gap in the United States, an in depth analysis of the southern and northeastern U.S. was employed in order to test the hypotheses that (5) women in the south are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and liberal ideology than their male counterparts and (6) women in the northeast are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and liberal ideology than their male counterparts. Both hypotheses are mostly supported by the regression model findings. In the northeast, the effect of gender on party identification was significant in the 1990's to the 2000's and the effect of gender on ideology was significant in the 1980's to the 2000's. These findings are not only intuitive because the United States is an advanced industrialized society, but also because the northeast specifically is an industrialized and more secular region in the United States.

In the south, the effect of gender on partisanship was significant in the 1990's to the 2000's with women leaning toward the Democratic Party and the effect of gender on ideology was significant in the 1990's to 2000's with women leaning toward liberal ideology. While these

findings support the hypothesis, the fact that the modern gender gap persists in this region given the prominence of the Republican Party and conservative ideological affiliations in southern states is a valuable finding. Regardless of the partisan and ideological stronghold, women are still identifying with the Democratic Party and liberal ideologies in the south while men in the region are increasingly identifying with the Republican Party and conservative ideologies. All in all, the gender gap behaves similarly in the northeast and the south and persists in these regions. These findings add to the literature on partisanship and ideology in the U.S. and should be considered in future studies in the northeast and the south.

Future Research

In regards to performing a cross-national analysis, including a measure of party identification or voting preference as a main dependent variable would allow for a more complete replication of and would function as a useful addition to Norris and Inglehart's (2000) analysis. Unfortunately some issues were posed with the party choice variable in the World Values Survey data set in this analysis, but utilization of such a variable in conjunction with the Inglehart-Huber (1995) expert party location scale would provide some interesting insight into the nature of the gender gap in party choice across various countries and society types. This scale provides codes for political parties across numerous democracies, rating them on a scale from 1=left to 10=right ideologically. If not this scale, a new, updated scale would be even more preferable in accurately understanding the nature of the gender gap today and in the future.

In order to further explore the developmental theory of the gender gap, future research should continue to study less developed countries (LDCs), newly industrialized countries (NICs)

and post-communist societies. As the regression models for the gender gap in post-communist societies showed, these nations may be experiencing a secular realignment with women leaning toward the left ideologically like advanced industrial societies. The LDCs and NICs had more variation, with some countries maintaining the traditional gender gap with women leaning to the Right and some nations experiencing a modern gender gap with women leaning toward the Left. By the reasoning of the developmental theory, as democratization, modernization, and industrialization persists these LDCs and NICs should eventually experience the modern gender gap as advanced industrialized nations do. Only through continual focus on partisanship and ideological affiliations in these regions can we better assess the validity of the developmental theory of the gender gap.

Additionally, other independent variables could certainly be included in later studies in order to have a more thorough evaluation of the gender gap topic. For example, a variable including different races like Asians or Hispanics could show how the gap varies on the basis of race in the United States. Race and/or ethnicity may be a challenging measure to include in a cross-national analysis, given that so many different races would have to be compared in a comprehensive and intuitive manner. Also, focusing on generational differences in the gender gap would certainly add to the existing literature. While age is included as an independent variable in this study, disaggregating the variable and looking at respondents under 30 against those over 30 years old could show stark differences in partisanship and ideological affiliation. Because younger women and men in the U.S. are identifying more with liberal ideology and the Democratic Party, examining this generation with and against older generations would show that other types of gender gaps exist (Norris and Inglehart 2000). Additionally, the inclusion of a

correlation between party identification and ideology in order to gauge how similar or different they are as dependent variables would be a helpful addition to future analyses. If they are extremely similar or highly correlated, only one dependent variable would be necessary but if they prove to have little to no correlation the inclusion of both would be pertinent in studying the gender gap.

Also, a state by state analysis of the gender gap in partisanship and ideology would be interesting to pursue, in that the cultural influence of individual states on the gender gap could be better assessed and understood in the United States. Specifically, the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) survey has a large enough N to perform a state by state analysis and would be particularly useful to include in further research. Large states with great variation in the population and in cultural attitudes and social structure may have an intra-state gender gap, which is an understudied area in U.S. politics. The U.S. specific analysis in this piece only included the northeast and the south as the regional variables as they are commonly believed to be the most polarized regions in regard to partisanship and ideology, but including the west and central United States in future studies would greatly benefit the existing literature by supporting or disproving the gender gap in the U.S. with a truly complete analysis of all 50 states.

Future researchers may also benefit from using a complete 2010's decade control variable in analyses of the gender gap in the U.S or across nations. Perhaps some of the understated findings regarding the weak relationship found between partisanship and gender and ideology and gender in 2012 in the United States is due to the fact that the analyses only include one year. Analyzing an entire decade may show a stronger relationship between gender and ideology and

gender and party identification as observed in previous decades but post-realignment. Obviously this study was restricted being that it is currently 2014 and the American National Election Study (ANES) Time Series only included the year 2012. While such a decade variable is out of the scope of this research for obvious reasons, analyzing the gender gap in the entire 2010s decade could certainly provide some insight on the prevalence or potential insignificance of this phenomenon.

Given that the U.S. is experiencing a modern gender gap based on these findings, an analysis of the gap before, during, and after the 2016 presidential election would be especially interesting as Hillary Clinton may be on the Democratic ticket. A female presidential candidate may be particularly polarizing, with women becoming even more Democratic in order to support a woman and men moving further toward the Republican Party. On the other hand, Hillary Clinton is somewhat polarizing in her own right, with men and women having mixed feelings and attitudes toward her and her past political experience and actions. Undoubtedly this unique occurrence in which a woman is in the running for the presidency would provide interesting insight and results into the nature of the gender gap in the U.S.

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